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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter explores contemporary regulation of medical privacy in the United States 
and Europe and its challenges. The need for privacy is a fundamental human necessity. 
Privacy relates to human beings’ ability to maintain their dignity and avoid disclosure of 
information that might be deemed unpleasant. It is also associated with personal autono­
my and informational self-determination. At the same time, however, some degree of data 
sharing is essential to the appropriate treatment of patients as well as to the proper func­
tioning of society in general and the healthcare system in particular. Thus, privacy cannot 
be limitless. Hence, this chapter discusses regulatory strengths and shortcomings and 
highlights gaps in the law. It also suggests further safeguards that policy-makers should 
implement in order to protect patients and data subjects.
Keywords: privacy, medical privacy, medical data, healthcare, information disclosure, medical information
1 Introduction
Medical privacy is cherished throughout the world. The value of privacy was recognized 
as early as the 5th century BCE and is included in the Hippocratic Oath. Physicians recit­
ing the oath have traditionally said: “whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my 
profession … if it be what should not be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding 
such things to be holy secrets.”1 Worldwide, the rule is that healthcare practitioners are 
bound by the duty not to disclose any information related to their patients, with excep­
tions applying only in some specific situations. This chapter explores contemporary regu­
lation of medical privacy in the United States and Europe2 and its challenges. It discusses 
regulatory strengths and shortcomings and highlight gaps in the law. The authors also 
suggest further safeguards that policy-makers should implement in order to protect pa­
tients and data subjects.
The need for privacy is a fundamental human necessity. Privacy relates to human beings’ 
ability to maintain their dignity and avoid disclosure of information that would be embar­
rassing, demeaning, or otherwise make others think less of them. Privacy is also associat­
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ed with personal autonomy and informational self-determination. Individuals seek privacy 
in order to control how others perceive them and to avoid abuses that might ensue if their 
sensitive data were easily available and could be used in harmful ways.3
At the same time, some degree of data sharing is essential to the appropriate treatment 
of patients as well as to the proper functioning of society in general and the healthcare 
system in particular. Thus, privacy cannot be limitless. At times, medical team members 
must share patient data in order to provide effective treatment. Health data about indi­
viduals are also essential to medical research and to many public health initiatives, such 
as responses to infectious disease outbreaks. Likewise, institutions may need to review 
patient data in order to assess and improve the quality of their services. Consequently, 
government officials must carefully weigh the benefits and risks of privacy versus infor­
mation exchange in formulating regulatory policies.4
In the era of omnipresent social media, one might ask whether individuals still value pri­
vacy. Many people, especially the young, routinely post intimate details, including med­
ical information, on Facebook and other platforms for large-scale public consumption. 
When surveyed, however, overwhelming majorities of respondents indicate that privacy is 
a priority value for them. Social media users trust in their ability to manage privacy set­
tings and to control access to their data.5 Privacy, therefore, remains a vital matter in 
contemporary society.
It is important to understand that three separate terms relate to protecting patients’ in­
terests: privacy, confidentiality, and security. Privacy focuses on the questions of whether 
information can be acquired and used, by whom, and under what circumstances, and thus 
on the patient’s rights regarding the use of medical information. Confidentiality is the 
principle that healthcare providers generally must not disclose patient information to 
third parties without patient authorization. Thus, while privacy is a patient right, confi­
dentiality is a professional obligation. Data security refers to mechanisms that prevent 
unauthorized individuals from accessing patient medical records. These can include pass­
words, encryption, and other technologies.6
In the 21st century, safeguarding privacy has become more challenging than ever before. 
Medical records no longer take the form of paper files that can be locked away in cabi­
nets. Their replacement, electronic health records (EHRs), can be hacked, easily ac­
cessed by unauthorized people through workplace computers, and lost or stolen if they 
are stored on laptops or USB devices. Medical big data repositories are being developed 
by numerous government and private entities for purposes of research, public health, 
quality improvement, and more.7 These, too, can be hacked or accessed by unapproved 
personnel. Wearable devices such as Fitbits, Apple Watches, and attachable baby moni­
tors also collect vast amounts of information and raise privacy concerns.8
Both the United States and the European Union (EU) have tackled the problem of privacy 
with major regulatory initiatives. In the United States, safeguards come in the form of the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, which became 
effective in 2003.9 At the level of EU law, medical information confidentiality is ensured 
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by the notion of data protection. EU data protection law aims to protect citizens’ rights 
over “personal data” in the context of information and communication technologies. The 
EU has enacted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),10 recognizing new rights 
for data subjects, which became applicable on May 25, 2018. HIPAA and GDPR have 
much in common. Both provide meaningful privacy protections for data subjects and re­
quire implementation of sound data security measures. Both carve out reasonable excep­
tions, such as permitting data use without patient authorization for purposes of judicial 
proceedings, legal requirements, public health measures, and medical treatment. Both 
provide patients with access to their own medical records and require covered entities to 
notify authorities of privacy breaches.
However, the United States and EU regulations diverge in significant ways. For example, 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule addresses only protected health information (PHI). By contrast, 
the GDPR covers all information concerning identified or identifiable persons and is not 
limited to healthcare. While HIPAA allows patients to place restrictions on use of their 
medical information, the GDPR sets up a legal framework in which personal data con­
cerning health may be processed. HIPAA allows healthcare providers to disclose PHI 
without patient consent to third parties such as insurers and billers for purposes of pay­
ment and healthcare administrative functions, while the GDPR might require a patient’s 
consent (e.g., for transmission to the patient’s insurance company) and the mandatory 
disclosure of some information about data processing to the patient. Another important 
difference is that the GDPR applies to organizations beyond the borders of the EU so long 
as they process data pertaining to EU citizens and the processing activities relate to the 
offering of goods or services or the monitoring of behavior that takes place within the EU. 
Conversely, the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s reach outside of the United States is limited to busi­
ness associates of US covered entities.
The chapter begins with an analysis of privacy and confidentiality. Section 2 addresses 
both together because they are interrelated principles that are essentially two sides of 
the same coin. The first section describes and critiques the US HIPAA Privacy Rule, other 
federal privacy laws, and state confidentiality mandates. The relevant statutory and regu­
latory provisions establish physicians’ duty to maintain patient confidentiality but also 
outline circumstances in which that duty must be breached and information must be re­
vealed to third parties. The section then addresses how European law (both from the 
Council of Europe and the EU) approaches medical information privacy and confidentiali­
ty and how the main legal rules (on data protection in general) interface with state-level 
laws about medical professional privilege and secrecy. Section 3 assesses the ways in 
which health data may lawfully be gathered to ensure data security. In the United States, 
this is covered by health data security regulations. In the EU context, health data security 
rules are part of the general rules governing “data processing.” The analysis then shifts 
in Section 4 to the question of data de-identification, another tool that is used to protect 
privacy. Section 5 examines remedies for unauthorized privacy breaches in the United 
States and EU and the means by which the EU’s GDPR is enforced. Section 6 focuses on 
anti-discrimination laws that prohibit certain uses of health information. In order to avoid 
privacy harms, regulators must strive both to control access to health data and to man­
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age the uses to which they are put once obtained. Thus, anti-discrimination statutes are a 
useful adjunct to privacy initiatives. The chapter concludes with a discussion of contem­
porary challenges to regulating privacy, especially in the United States. In particular, it 
considers the following: (1) growing and ever-evolving data security threats, (2) the pro­
liferation of health data stemming from sources such as social media, and (3) the emer­
gence of predictive health data.
2 Privacy and Confidentiality
2.1 American Law
The word “privacy” does not appear in the US Constitution. However, a variety of cele­
brated Supreme Court decisions have established that the Constitution encompasses pri­
vacy rights.11 Furthermore, the American Medical Association’s Principles of Medical 
Ethics states that “A physician shall respect the rights of patients, colleagues, and other 
health professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences and privacy within the con­
straints of the law.”12 This principle is reflected in numerous federal and state laws.
Nevertheless, American medical privacy laws and regulations have significant gaps and 
limitations. Moreover, the Supreme Court has declined to determine whether the Consti­
tution establishes a right to informational privacy.13 Many state laws preceded the enact­
ment of the federal HIPAA regulations, but the latter superseded any state statutes that 
provided weaker protections.14 This section examines the substance and scope of US fed­
eral and state privacy laws.
2.1.1 The HIPAA Privacy Rule
The HIPAA regulations were promulgated pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996 and were amended in accordance with the Health Infor­
mation Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 2009.15 The HIPAA 
Privacy Rule governs the disclosure of electronic and hard-copy medical information and 
allows patients to control their medical records to a degree. The Privacy Rule establishes 
that, with some exceptions, hospitals, physicians, health insurers, and other covered enti­
ties must obtain patients’ permission before disclosing their medical data to others.16 This 
is a key confidentiality safeguard for American patients, though it is far from absolute and 
its limits are discussed in the next sub-section.
Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, covered entities must also give patients notice of their pri­
vacy practices17 and must allow patients to view their health records and request that 
they be modified or used restrictively.18 In addition, covered entities that experience pri­
vacy breaches of unsecured data, such as incidents of hacking, must notify affected indi­
viduals and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and, in the case of 
large breaches, must notify the media as well.19
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2.1.1.1 The Boundaries of the HIPAA Privacy Rule
While the HIPAA regulations are the most detailed and comprehensive medical privacy 
regulations in the United States, many critics argue that they fall far short of adequately 
protecting American patients. The federal regulations’ limitations are rooted primarily in 
three factors: (1) the definition of “covered entity,” (2) the numerous Privacy Rule excep­
tions, and (3) the definition of “protected health information.”
The Definition of “Covered Entities.” The HIPAA Privacy Rule does not govern many enti­
ties and individuals who handle private health information. The regulations define “cov­
ered entities” as including health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and healthcare 
providers who transmit health information electronically for purposes of HIPAA-relevant 
transactions and their business associates.20 Thus, they do not cover employers; mar­
keters; website operators; insurers issuing life, disability, or long-term care policies; and 
numerous others who may handle large volumes of health information.21
There is no doubt that health information is routinely processed and stored by those out­
side the healthcare industry. Employers, for example, frequently subject applicants and 
employees to medical inquiries and examinations.22 They also can obtain records for pur­
poses of workers’ compensation claims, wellness programs, reasonable accommodation 
requests by individuals with disabilities, or Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) requests.23
Patients themselves often willingly disclose data to non-covered entities, such as Fitbit 
vendors or website operators. For example, WebMD’s Symptom Checker asks users to 
provide details about their age, sex, zip code, e-mail, and symptoms in order to identify 
their potential health conditions and suggest treatments.24
Entities that are not covered by HIPAA remain free of its regulatory obligations. For ex­
ample, no matter how much health information employers, websites, or marketers pos­
sess, they are not required to implement HIPAA’s data security measures.
An additional concern is that many US healthcare providers outsource work such as med­
ical transcription, billing, and reading radiological tests (x-rays, computed tomography 
[CT] scans, magnetic resonance imaging [MRIs]) to workers in developing countries as a 
cost-saving measure.25 While the regulations technically cover those engaged in such off­
shore work as “business associates,” in reality, it is extremely unlikely that the US gov­
ernment would be able to reach such individuals for purposes of any enforcement action 
in case of noncompliance. Therefore, the practice of outsourcing to offshore professionals 
creates another regulatory gap and exacerbates patients’ privacy vulnerabilities.
Regulatory Exceptions. The HIPAA regulations’ scope is further limited by numerous ex­
ceptions that allow covered entities to disclose health information without patient autho­
rization. First, covered entities may divulge patients’ medical information without their 
permission for purposes of treatment, payment, and healthcare operations.26 Thus, physi­
cians can consult colleagues or speak to nurses about a patient and can have administra­
tors review records for billing or other office-related purposes without the patients’ 
knowledge. Reportedly, during the course of a typical hospitalization, up to 150 individu­
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als may see the patient’s records, including doctors, nurses, medical technicians, and 
billing clerks.27
In addition, healthcare providers do not need to obtain patient authorization for disclo­
sures that are (1) required by law; (2) necessary for public health activities; (3) related to 
victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence; (4) required for purposes of health over­
sight activities; (5) necessary for judicial and administrative proceedings; (6) required for 
law enforcement purposes; (7) made in order to facilitate cadaveric organ, eye, or tissue 
donation; (8) provided for medical research purposes (with certain privacy safeguards in 
place); (9) necessary to avert a serious threat to health or safety; (10) needed for special­
ized government functions, such as national security and intelligence activities; and (11) 
authorized by law in order to provide workers’ compensation.28
In general, the HIPAA exceptions are reasonable and logical. However, Americans must 
understand that they may have little awareness of who is viewing their medical informa­
tion and for what purposes it is being used.
The Definition of “Protected Health Information” and Data De-identification. A third im­
portant limitation relates to the type of information that the privacy regulations protect. 
PHI is defined as “individually identifiable health information” that is electronically or 
otherwise transmitted or maintained.29 However, great volumes of information are stored 
in de-identified form in databases used for nontreatment purposes such as research, qual­
ity assessment, and public health initiatives.30 De-identified data are entirely exempt from 
HIPAA coverage and can be disclosed without patient authorization. Data de-identifica­
tion is explored further in Section 4.
2.1.2 Additional Federal Laws Relevant to Medical Privacy
The HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules are not the only federal laws or regulations to ad­
dress medical privacy. Several important federal laws include privacy safeguards. For ex­
ample, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) allows employers to subject applicants 
and employees to medical inquiries and examinations but mandates that they maintain 
the confidentiality of medical information and store it separately from other employee 
records.31 Likewise, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) governs 
records held by educational institutions, including those containing health data.32 The Ge­
netic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) prohibits employers and insurers from 
seeking genetic information in order to ensure the privacy of such data.33 An additional 
privacy safeguard is furnished by the federal research regulations, known as the “Com­
mon Rule,” which mandate that investigators ask research participants for permission to 
use their identifiable health information.34 None of these laws includes detailed guide­
lines as to how data security should be maintained. Nevertheless, professionals handling 
medical information of any type should be familiar with all relevant privacy regulations.
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2.1.3 State Statutory and Common Law Privacy Rights
Medical privacy rights have been codified in the statutes of all of the states and the Dis­
trict of Columbia. To varying degrees, the state law provisions (1) allow patients access to 
their medical records; (2) restrict data use and disclosure by providers, employers, gov­
ernment agencies, and others; (3) establish legal privileges, such as the psychotherapist– 
patient privilege; (4) address specific conditions, such as alcohol or substance abuse, can­
cer, genetic testing, sexually transmitted disease, HIV/AIDS, and mental health; and (5) 
require breach notification in particular circumstances.35 Many states have laws that pro­
vide stronger privacy protections than HIPAA. For example, they may cover a broader 
range of entities that handle health information or provide a private cause of action for 
privacy breaches.36 Some experts consider the HIPAA Privacy Rule to constitute the floor 
of privacy protections, with states furnishing additional safeguards.37
Like federal law, state laws carve out significant exceptions to their privacy mandates. 
The states have all established reporting requirements. Generally, healthcare providers 
must report to state government agencies incidents of particular conditions, such as in­
fectious disease, HIV/AIDS, cancer, and congenital defects, and their reports must include 
personally identifying details.38 The government, therefore, has significant collections of 
patient information.
The states have also adopted “duty to warn” statutes that either permit or require health­
care providers to disclose patient information in particular circumstances. Generally, dis­
closure to law enforcement authorities and potential victims is required or permitted if a 
patient appears intent on harming himself or others. Thus, a mental healthcare provider 
with whom a patient discussed a well-formed plan to engage in violence could not main­
tain confidentiality with respect to that discussion.39 Physicians may also be required to 
disclose private medical information to third parties in order to warn individuals that they 
are at risk of having been exposed to a disease.40
The enactment of many of these statutes followed the well-known ruling in Tarasoff v. The 
Regents of the University of California.41 The case involved a patient who murdered a 
woman after disclosing to his psychologist that he intended to do so because she had re­
jected him as a romantic partner. The Supreme Court of California held that therapists 
who determine or should recognize that their patients pose a serious risk of violence to 
others have an obligation to “use reasonable care to protect the intended victim[s] 
against such dangers,” even at the cost of breaching patient confidentiality.42
2.2 European Law: The Organization of the Legal Framework
In Europe, medical information privacy and confidentiality are protected by fundamental 
rights: the right to respect for private life and the right to data protection. This statement 
requires some further elaboration. Formally, European law43 recognizes the “right to pri­
vate and family life” in the European Convention on Human Rights, a Council of Europe 
instrument to which 49 European states, including all Member States of the EU, are sig­
natories. The recognition of a right to data protection has been part of the evolution and 
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development of the data protection rules, both in their adoption in legislation and execu­
tive implementation and their judicial interpretation, at the level of Member States, in­
cluding national courts, and through the case law of the Council of Europe’s European 
Court of Human Rights (in Strasbourg, France) and the EU’s Court of Justice (Luxem­
bourg). The right to data protection has thus emerged and been developed as a phenome­
non of reciprocal influences between different levels of legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers in Europe. The result is a relatively complex set of laws, few of which are specifi­
cally designed to regulate medical privacy and confidentiality. Overall, therefore, medical 
information confidentiality and privacy is ensured by data protection rules adopted at the 
European level and implemented at the Member State level and by medical professional 
privilege and secrecy rules adopted at the level of each European state. Neither set of 
rules derogate from the other: each must be applied alongside the other.44
2.2.1 Council of Europe Law
The first work on data protection at the European level began at the Council of Europe in 
the late 1960s, with the adoption of two recommendations on automatic processing of 
personal data which shaped the first outline of the legal framework for ensuring data pro­
tection in Europe. These recommendations concerned databases in the private sector45 
and the public sector.46 The continuation and development of the Council of Europe’s ac­
tivities in data protection resulted in the adoption of the 1981 Convention for the Protec­
tion of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Treaty no. 108), 
updated in 2018,47 as well as numerous sectoral or thematic recommendations, among 
which are included recommendations on medical data.48
Relatively early in time several cases related to data protection were brought before the 
European Court of Human Rights. Since the Z v. Finland judgment in 1997, the European 
Court of Human Rights Court has repeatedly and consistently proclaimed that
(1) The protection of personal data (and health information are not the least) plays a 
fundamental role in the exercise of the right to respect for private and family life;
(2) Respecting the confidentiality of health information is an essential principle of 
the legal system of all Contracting Parties to the Convention; it is essential not only 
to protect patients’ privacy but also to preserve their confidence in the medical pro­
fession and health services in general. Without such protection, persons requiring 
medical care could be discouraged from providing the personal and intimate infor­
mation necessary to get the appropriate treatment and even to consult a doctor. That 
could end up jeopardizing their health or, in case of communicable diseases, that of 
the community.
(3) Domestic legislation should therefore provide appropriate safeguards to prevent 
the use of personal data and in particular any communication or disclosure of per­
sonal data relating to health, which does not comply with the guarantees provided by 
the Article 8 right to private and family life of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.
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In addition to this assertion of the importance and need to protect personal data for the 
exercise of the right to respect for private and family life,49 the European Court of Human 
Rights has developed a substantial case-law in many areas relevant to data protection. 
Those most relevant to medical privacy and confidentiality include protection of medical 
data, medical records, medical records security, access rights (including the right to get a 
copy), data security, and genetic testing. For example, in the case of I. v. Finland (2008), 
the Court judged that Finland failed to provide a practical and effective protection exclud­
ing any possibility of unauthorized access to a medical file.
2.2.2 European Union Law
At the level of the European Community (now the EU), the issue of data protection was 
formally embraced by the European Parliament on April 8, 1976. It resulted in the adop­
tion, in 1979, of a Resolution on the protection of human rights in the face of the develop­
ment of technical progress in the field of informatics.50 Then, after the adoption of the Or­
ganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for the Protec­
tion of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows in 1980, the European Community adopted in 
1995 the Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the process­
ing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.51 This was the first binding 
EU legal instrument on data protection.
The right to data protection was explicitly and formally recognized at the “constitutional” 
level in EU law in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on Decem­
ber 7k 2000, Article 8.52
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union also recognizes, under its provi­
sions of general application, the right to data protection.53
From May 25, 2018, the GDPR ensures data protection in (and in some circumstances be­
yond) the EU.54 The GDPR is applicable in 27 countries and concerns directly more than 
430,000,000 people within the EU. It also has significant indirect effects, notably in the 
matter of transfers of personal data to third countries or international organizations.55
It is to this extent that any person who comes under the jurisdiction of a Member State56 
has the right to claim the protection of his or her personal data. It is not only an obliga­
tion on the part of the healthcare professional or the Member State but also, and above 
all, a fundamental right which the data subject can claim.57
2.2.2.1 The Boundaries of the GDPR: Material Scope
At the level of EU law, the scope of protection for medical information confidentiality and 
privacy is defined by the scope of the GDPR. The GDPR protects individuals with regard 
to the “processing” of “personal data,” including personal data related to health. In order 
to be protected by the Regulation, personal data must be automatically processed, in 
whole or in part, or at least be included in a paper file.58 Any use of personal data is a 
kind of data processing. So is the mere fact of looking at personal data. But to be subject 
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to the GDPR, the data processing must be, in addition, automated or be part of a paper 
filing system.
“Personal data” means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person (data subject). An identifiable natural person is a human being who can be identi­
fied, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier. The data subject 
does not have to be identified. It only has to be possible to identify the data subject.59 The 
definition of personal data remains substantially unchanged from the earlier Directive, 
except for the description of the elements likely to help the identification of the data sub­
ject.60
According to the GDPR and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU, the concept of 
personal data must be interpreted as widely as possible. For instance, IP addresses or 
codes for medical nomenclature (this refers to the classification of medical acts through 
specific codes for social security purposes) are personal data.
We could question the relevance of the notion of “personal data,” especially in the context 
of development of big data and data mining or of artificial intelligence, and argue that the 
focus should be put on the impact of technologies on the citizen for justifying and devel­
oping their regulation, rather than on the personal nature of the data per se.
2.2.2.2 Health Data in the GDPR
Personal data concerning health are a special category of personal data. They are defined 
in the GDPR as “personal data related to the physical or mental health of a natural per­
son, including the provision of healthcare services, which reveal information about his or 
her health status.”61 Personal data concerning health should include all data pertaining to 
the health status of a data subject which reveal information relating to the past, current, 
or future physical or mental health status of the data subject. This includes information 
about the natural person collected in the course of the registration for or the provision of 
healthcare services, as referred to in Directive 2011/24/EU on cross-border healthcare. 
Personal data concerning health also include a number, symbol, or particular assigned to 
a natural person to uniquely identify the natural person for health purposes. It covers in­
formation derived from the testing or examination of a body part or bodily substance, in­
cluding from genetic data and biological samples. It also covers any information on, for 
example, a disease, disability, disease risk, medical history, clinical treatment, or the 
physiological or biomedical state of the data subject. The notion of personal data concern­
ing health is regardless of its source (e.g., whether from a physician or other health pro­
fessional, a hospital, a medical device, or an in vitro diagnostic test).62
This definition is very broad to the extent that it covers data which, in themselves, do not 
relate to the data subject’s health, but from which we could extract information concern­
ing the data subject’s health (such as from data collected when a patient is registered in a 
hospital: at first sight, these are not related to the patient’s health but are merely admin­
istrative information). It also covers data that do not relate to the data subject’s health, 
Privacy and Integrity of Medical Information
Page 11 of 47
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 05 August 2020
but which could help in finding information concerning the data subject’s health (such as 
a patient’s identifier in a national healthcare system).
2.2.2.3 The Link Between Personal Health Data and Genetic Data
In its 2004 working document on genetic data,63 the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party considered that, in the majority of cases, genetic data were personal data. It added 
that genetic data may provide to an extent a detailed picture of a person’s physical dispo­
sition and health condition and therefore could be considered as “data concerning 
health.” However, it added that genetic data may also describe specific forms of a wide 
range of physical characteristics, and, in this case, genetic data that determine the color 
of someone’s hair, for example, may not be regarded as data directly concerning health.
Today, the GDPR defines genetic data as personal data relating to the inherited or ac­
quired genetic characteristics of a natural person and providing unique information about 
the physiology or the health of that natural person. In addition, the data must result from 
the analysis of a biological sample from the natural person in question, in particular chro­
mosomal, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), or ribonucleic acid (RNA) analysis, or from the 
analysis of another element enabling equivalent information to be obtained.64 It can be 
deduced that, although they should not be confused, genetic data may qualify as personal 
data concerning health, depending upon the circumstances.
2.2.2.5 Definition of Personal Data Concerning Health in the GDPR
We should try to keep a strict and objective definition of the notion of personal data con­
cerning health. It should be limited to data containing an element of knowledge about an 
individual’s health status, excluding by that any attempt to cover data that do not contain 
any information on an individual’s health, even if it is possible to deduce personal data 
concerning health from the information (mainly because of the purpose pursued by the 
data processing or the context). Furthermore, any data deduced or extracted will auto­
matically be protected under the GDPR by reason of its informational content. In doing 
so, the data from which information on an individual’s health has been deduced or ex­
tracted will not be governed by a status which is not appropriate for these data and which 
does not offer, in reality, any real protection for the data subject. Moreover, it is not sensi­
ble to include within the GDPR’s definition of health data, those data that are not related 
to health but from which one can deduce information on the data subject’s health. That is 
for a very simple reason: it is now possible to deduce information relating to an 
individual’s health from a multitude of completely unspecified data. It is therefore better 
in terms of legal precision to circumscribe the notion to only data which contain informa­
tion about the data subject’s health.
It should be remembered that data concerning health do not need to come from a health 
professional, result from an act reserved to health professionals, or arise in the context of 
health institutions or systems. In addition, data may concern health even when those data 
are not processed for therapeutic purposes. This is particularly the case with regard to in­
surance or credit card payments. Moreover, the mere information relating to a physical or 
psychological aspect of an individual does not necessarily constitute, as such, data con­
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cerning health. To gain this last legal qualification, the physical or psychic aspect must 
teach us something about the health of the data subject. In this sense, data concerning 
health are all pieces of information relating to the physical or mental health, past, present 
or future, of a natural person, living or dead.
In practice, all patient data collected in European healthcare settings will fall within the 
protections of the GDPR either as plain personal data or as a special category of personal 
data.
2.2.2.6 The Boundaries of the GDPR: Territorial Scope
To be protected by the GDPR, the data processing situation has to fall within its territorial 
scope. The GDPR applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities 
of an establishment of a data controller65 or a processor66 in the EU, regardless of 
whether the processing takes place in the EU or not.67 It is thus beyond doubt that the 
processing of a patient’s data carried out by a healthcare professional established in the 
EU, providing healthcare to a patient in Europe, falls under the scope of the Regulation.
If the data controller or processor is not established in the EU, the Regulation applies to 
the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the EU where the processing 
activities are related to the offering of goods or services to such data subjects in the EU 
or to the monitoring of data subjects’ behavior as far as their behavior takes place within 
the EU.68
But the Regulation does not specify what is meant by a person who is on the territory of 
the EU. This concept may cover accidental or tourist presence, transit, mere residence, 
domicile, or principal or secondary establishment in the territory of the EU (i.e., within 
the territory of a Member State of the EU). Moreover, these notions do not have necessar­
ily the same meaning in all Member States. Finally the Regulation applies to the process­
ing of personal data by a controller not established in the EU but in a place where Mem­
ber State law applies by virtue of public international law.
The territorial reach of the GDPR is thus wide. It therefore applies in a range of cross- 
border healthcare contexts involving states outside of the EU.
2.2.2.7 The Boundaries of the GDPR: Personal Scope
Like the earlier Convention of 1981 or the Data Protection Directive of 1995, the GDPR 
does not explicitly determine its personal scope. However, the Regulation identifies the 
main actors in data processing. As in the Directive, the data controller is the person who, 
alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the data processing69 
and the processor is the one who processes personal data on behalf of the data 
controller.70 Doctors, other health professionals, hospitals, and other providers of care all 
fall into the category of data controller or processor. The Regulation also identifies the re­
cipient,71 the third party,72 the representative,73 the enterprise,74 and the group of under­
takings.75 There are many controversies about who qualifies as data controller, joint data 
controller, data processor in hospitals and in the healthcare sector in general.
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As with the earlier Directive, the GDPR still does not provide a formal definition of the da­
ta subject, even though the latter is supposed to be at the heart of the regulatory system. 
In any case, the Regulation insists on the point that the protection applies irrespective of 
the nationality or residence of the data subject.76 Protection under the GDPR extends to 
persons who are not nationals of any Member State and who do not reside in the territory 
of any Member State but whose data are processed by a data controller subject to the 
Regulation. This approach means that all patients whose personal data are processed in 
the context of healthcare systems or situations within Member States of the EU are cov­
ered by the GDPR’s protections.
In any case, all these actors must be properly identified when processing personal data. 
This can lead to some problems, in particular in the context of Internet platforms for 
patient’s data communication, cloud computing services,77 or mobile applications 
(mHealth).78 Who assumes the role of data controller, joint data controller, or data proces­
sor?
2.2.2.8 Substantive/Material Rules of the GDPR on Medical Information Privacy and 
Confidentiality
The GDPR enumerates common uniform substantive rules and details the principles ap­
plicable to all data processing within its scope, including to the processing of personal da­
ta concerning health. The principles are not that substantially different from the rules 
previously laid down by the earlier Data Protection Directive. Seven principles apply to all 
processing of personal data.
Principles of personal data processing. Personal data must be processed lawfully, fairly, 
and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject (principles of lawfulness, fair­
ness, and transparency).79 Personal data must be collected for specified, explicit, and le­
gitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those 
purposes (principle of purpose limitation).80 Further processing for archiving purposes in 
the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes, or statistical purposes 
should not be considered as incompatible with the initial purposes, provided that it is sub­
ject to appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. These 
guarantees must ensure that technical and organizational measures are set in place to 
ensure compliance with the data minimization principle.81 Whenever possible, further 
processing should not, or no more than previously, allow for the identification of the data 
subject. Personal data must be adequate, relevant, and limited to what is necessary in re­
lation to the purposes for which they are processed (principle of data minimization). Per­
sonal data must be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. Every reasonable step 
must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate in regard to the purposes 
for which they are processed are erased or rectified without delay (principle of accuracy).
Personal data must be kept in a form that permits identification of data subjects for no 
longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed 
(principle of storage limitation). Personal data may be stored for longer periods insofar as 
the personal data will be processed solely for archiving purposes in the public interest, 
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scientific or historical research purposes, or statistical purposes provided that it is sub­
ject to appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subject. These 
guarantees must ensure that technical and organizational measures are set in place to 
ensure compliance with the data minimization principle.82 Whenever possible, further 
processing should not or no more allow for the identification of the data subject.
Personal data must be processed in a manner that ensures an appropriate security of the 
personal data, including protection against unauthorized or unlawful processing and 
against accidental loss, destruction, or damage using appropriate technical or organiza­
tional measures (principle of integrity and confidentiality). Finally, the controller is re­
sponsible for compliance with the principles applicable to the processing of personal da­
ta. The controller must also, and that is formally new, be able to demonstrate that the da­
ta processing is compliant with these principles (principle of accountability).83
2.2.2.9 Data Processing Lawfulness
The GDPR, Article 6, lists the categories of situations in which it is a priori lawful (i.e., 
permitted by law) to process personal data.84 These include where the data subject has 
given consent for specific purposes, or to protect the vital interests of the data subject or 
another natural person, or is necessary for a task carried out in the public interest.
At first glance, it would seem that processing of health data is barred by the GDPR. As 
with personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, sexual orientation, political opinions, 
religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, the processing of data con­
cerning health,85 genetic data, or biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a 
natural person is in principle prohibited.86
But this general prohibition does not apply to many situations in which health data are 
processed in the healthcare setting. Article 9.2 of the GDPR lists the categories of situa­
tions in which it is lawful to process personal data. This includes where explicit consent is 
given, to protect the vital interests of the data subject, or processing is necessary for rea­
sons of substantial public interest.
To put it another way, each of these categories is supposed to represent a situation in 
which the interests involved are in an acceptable balance. The interests to be taken into 
consideration are those of the data controller, the data subject, and the community. In line 
with the legitimation mechanisms set up by the earlier Directive, it is of course necessary 
to verify in each individual case, for each data processing taken and considered separate­
ly and individually, whether there is a fair balance among these three kinds of interests. 
This balance must be done in concreto and not only a priori and in abstracto. In this re­
spect, changing the balance of interests over time (e.g., because of changing understand­
ings of the interests of communities, data subjects, or data controllers arising from new 
technologies) will have the effect of removing the legitimacy of the data processing for 
the future. The data processing will have to be stopped unless a solution is found to satis­
factorily rebalance the interests involved.
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Surprisingly, while one of the objectives of the reform of the legal framework for data pro­
tection was to eliminate inconsistencies between Member States regarding the process­
ing of personal data relating to health, the GDPR provides that, in respect of the sub­
sidiarity principle, matters should be dealt with at the most local level at which they can 
be resolved, and Member States may maintain or introduce further conditions, including 
limitations, with regard to the processing of genetic data, biometric data, or data con­
cerning health.87 It follows that the differences between Member States, which have been 
strongly condemned, are likely to increase in the matter of personal data related to 
health.
Furthermore, the GDPR does not lay down criteria for delimiting the territorial scope of 
the national provisions that Member States might adopt regarding the processing of ge­
netic data, biometric data, or health data.88
It remains, of course, that, in any case, without prejudice to the Council of Europe’s 
Treaty No. 108, Member States are bound by the common legal framework that emerges 
from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in the field of data protection 
and by the rights therefore granted to individuals in terms of data control (situations in 
which the Court considers that the person is entitled to expect that data will not be dis­
closed without his or her consent), data access (including access to medical records), or 
medical records security, for example.
In addition to these Council of Europe and EU-level rules, therefore, medical information 
privacy and confidentiality is subject to national substantive rules which differ across Eu­
ropean states.
2.2.3 State Laws
The protection of health data is integrated in the general framework which has been set 
up for protecting personal data in Europe. Hence, unlike in the US, the protection of 
health data is not restricted to a specific sector of activities (healthcare), to certain pro­
fessionals (health practitioners) or institutions (health service providers), or to particular 
categories of citizens (patients). The European legal context is thus quite distinctive as 
compared to the usual features of the notion of medical professional privilege or profes­
sional secrecy. This raises the issue of the distinction between data protection rules (pro­
mulgated at European level) and medical professional privilege or professional secrecy 
rules (promulgated at national levels). As EU law applies only within the scope of EU 
competence, and Council of Europe law leaves a significant “margin of appreciation” to 
states parties, despite the European-level norms there remains room for distinctive ap­
proaches to medical privacy and confidentiality through the vector of professional privi­
lege and secrecy law.
The transposition of the 1995 Data Protection Directive89 into Belgian Law is a good ex­
ample. To what extent did Belgium’s implementation of data protection rules have an im­
pact on professional secrecy rules? More specifically, did the data subject’s consent, used 
as a basis of legitimization for the processing of personal data under data protection 
Privacy and Integrity of Medical Information
Page 16 of 47
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 05 August 2020
rules, also discharge healthcare practitioners of their duty not to disclose any information 
about their patients under provision 458 of the Belgian Criminal Code (the latter protect­
ing professional secrecy)? For instance, in this context, might the patient allow the health 
practitioner to send medical information to the insurance company? In a classical crimi­
nal point of view, it was not permissible for a patient to discharge healthcare practition­
ers from their duty not to disclose information about them except in some situations vest­
ed in the law, the case-law, and the legal literature. The issue was even more sensitive in 
that it was part of a larger discussion about patients’ rights at national, European, and in­
ternational levels and especially about empowering patients in the therapeutic relation­
ship (which could concern the power to master the fate of information protected by pro­
fessional secrecy).
Nevertheless, the answer was obvious: it had never been the intent of European data pro­
tection rules to modify professional secrecy rules. Indeed, the objective of data protection 
rules was and still is to protect individuals against the development of information and 
communication technologies and, in particular, to protect them against paper files and 
automated processing of personal data and to entrust them with new subjective rights. 
There has never been any intent to interfere with the regulation of healthcare professions 
or with the (legal and ethical) duties of healthcare practitioners. Two arguments support­
ed this interpretation. First, the Data Protection Directive referred to professional secre­
cy rules90 without any hint that it intended to modify them. Therefore, it was already pos­
sible to infer from this that professional secrecy rules were separate from data protection 
rules. Second, the duty to lawfully process personal data91 was interpreted as meaning 
that it included the duty to comply with the special rules applicable to the processed da­
ta, which refers in this case to professional secrecy rules.92
The question is now whether this interpretation is still valid since the adoption of the 
GDPR. Three reasons suggest that it is. First, the GDPR pursues the same goal as the Di­
rective, though in a more elaborate way. In addition, the GDPR also refers to professional 
secrecy rules without saying it would impact or modify them.93 Rather, as in the case of 
the preceding Directive, the GDPR provides that the ban on processing personal data 
does not apply to the special categories of personal data (among them those related to 
health) where those are processed for therapeutic purposes by a health professional sub­
ject to the obligation of professional secrecy (under Union or Member State law or rules 
established by national competent bodies) or, under responsibility of the latter, by anoth­
er person also subject to an obligation of secrecy (under Union or Member State law or 
rules established by national competent bodies). Second, Member States are permitted 
under the GDPR to maintain or introduce further conditions (including limitations) with 
regard to the processing of genetic data, biometric data, or data concerning health.94 
This national discretion covers the question of maintaining, changing, or adopting new 
professional secrecy rules. Third, the GDPR explicitly provides that Member States may 
adopt specific rules to set out the powers of the supervisory authorities in relation to con­
trollers or processors that are subject, under Union or Member State law or rules estab­
lished by national competent bodies, to an obligation of professional secrecy or other 
equivalent obligations of secrecy where this is necessary and proportionate to reconcile 
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the right of the protection of personal data with the obligation of secrecy.95 Thus, the 
GDPR has neither the objective nor the effect of modifying existing state-level rules re­
garding professional secrecy: it refers to them as external rules, and it recognizes the 
possible application of these external rules, notably when processing personal data relat­
ed to health for therapeutic purposes.
Hence, to summarize, medical data confidentiality and privacy in Europe is regulated at 
Council of Europe, EU, and national levels, too.
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3 Data Security
Personal health data can be a sought-after commodity that brings financial and other ben­
efits to numerous parties. For example, employers are interested in health information 
because they want workers who will not have absenteeism or productivity problems or 
generate high health insurance costs. Marketers hope to tailor their advertising efforts to 
consumers’ individualized needs and thus could find certain health details to be a great 
asset. Even criminals may seek data in order to commit identity theft, credit card fraud, 
or medical insurance fraud.96 Consequently, without proper security defenses, medical 
data may be very vulnerable to hacking, theft, and other abuses. This section examines 
the legal mechanisms that the United States and EU have implemented to promote data 
security.
3.1 The HIPAA Security Rule
The HIPAA Security Rule is less well-known than the Privacy Rule in the United States 
but is equally important. It delineates administrative, physical, and technical safeguards 
to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic health information 
(EHI).97 The administrative safeguard standards include security management processes 
and workforce security, such as clearance procedures, information access management, 
security awareness and training, security incident procedures, and contingency plans.98 
Physical safeguards focus on facility access controls, workstation security, and device and 
media controls.99 Technical safeguards are procedures to control access to EHI (e.g., en­
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cryption), to audit activity related to processing EHI, to protect EHI from improper modi­
fication or elimination, and to obtain authentication from those seeking access to EHI.100
The HIPAA Security Rule suffers from the same limitations that restrict the scope of the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule. It covers only health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, healthcare 
providers who transmit health information electronically for purposes of HIPAA-relevant 
transactions, and their business associates.101 Thus, employers, life insurers, educational 
institutions, marketers, and many others who possess health information do not have to 
comply with its important data security requirements. Furthermore, because de-identified 
data do not constitute protected health information,102 they, too, are not governed by the 
Security Rule and can be stored in ways that do not comply with its standards.
3.2 Data Security in the GDPR
Security of personal data in the GDPR forms part of a series of new uniform substantive 
rules to which data controllers and processors are subject. These include, for instance, 
record keeping, cooperation with supervisory authorities, and privacy impact assessment.
As far as data security is concerned, the data controller and processor must implement 
appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure a level of security appropri­
ate to the risk. They must take into account the state of the art; the costs of implementa­
tion; and the nature, scope, context, and purposes of processing as well as the risk of 
varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons. In assess­
ing the appropriate level of security, they must take into account in particular the risks 
presented by the data processing, in particular from accidental or unlawful destruction, 
loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to personal data transmitted, 
stored, or otherwise processed.103 Those measures must be reviewed and updated where 
necessary. Where proportionate in relation to processing activities, these measures must 
include the implementation of appropriate data protection policies by the data 
controller.104
Privacy by design imposes obligations on the data controller (and processor) to imple­
ment, both at the time of the determination of the means for processing and at the time of 
the processing itself, appropriate technical and organizational measures (such as pseudo­
nymization) which are designed to implement data-protection principles (such as data 
minimization) in an effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the 
processing in order to meet the requirements of the GDPR and protect the rights of data 
subjects. In doing so, the data controller has to take into account the state of the art; the 
cost of implementation; and the nature, scope, context, and purposes of processing as 
well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for rights and freedoms of natural per­
sons posed by the processing.105
Privacy by default obliges the data controller (and processor) to implement appropriate 
technical and organizational measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data 
that are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obliga­
tion applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the 
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period of their storage, and their accessibility. In particular, such measures must ensure 
that, by default, personal data are not made accessible without the individual’s interven­
tion to an indefinite number of natural persons.106 In any case, the data controller and 
processor must take steps to ensure that any natural person acting under the authority of 
the controller or the processor who has access to personal data does not process them ex­
cept on instructions from the controller unless required to do so by Union or Member 
State law.
All this means that hospitals and health practitioners must implement and adapt the gen­
eral requirements imposed by the GDPR to all data processing. For example, the use of 
cloud computing by a hospital is not necessarily prohibited by the GDPR. But the imple­
mentation of data protection rules could require the use of a public cloud for administra­
tive data and of a private cloud for more sensitive data.
4 Data De-identification, Anonymous Data, and 
Pseudonymized Data
As noted earlier, bountiful health information is stored in de-identified form in databases 
that are available to researchers, government officials, and sometimes the public at 
large.107 What is de-identified information? The HIPAA Privacy Rule provides detailed 
guidance. GDPR distinguishes between anonymous data and pseudonymized data.
4.1 De-Identification Under HIPAA
HIPAA states that health information is de-identified if (1) a qualified expert determines 
that there is only a “very small” risk that the data can be re-identified, and (2) the expert 
documents his or her analysis.108 The DHHS issued guidance that recognized several ef­
fective de-identification techniques:
• Suppression: Redacting particular identifiers before data is disclosed (e.g., zip codes, 
birthdates, income)
• Generalization: Transforming particular information into less specific representa­
tions (e.g., indicating a 10-year age range instead of exact age)
• Perturbation: Exchanging particular data values for equally specific but different val­
ues (e.g., changing patients’ ages).109
In the alternative, the HIPAA Privacy Rule lists 18 items that should be removed in order 
to exempt information from HIPAA coverage. These are names; all geographic subdivi­
sions smaller than a state, including street address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and 
their equivalent geocodes, except for the initial three digits of a zip code (if, according to 
the current publicly available data from the Bureau of the Census the geographic unit 
formed by combining all zip codes with the same three initial digits contains more than 
20,000 people, and the initial three digits of a zip code for all such geographic units con­
taining 20,000 or fewer people is changed to 000); all elements of dates (except year) for 
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dates directly related to an individual, including birth date, admission date, discharge 
date, date of death, and all ages over 89 and all elements of dates (including year) indica­
tive of such age, except that such ages and elements may be aggregated into a single cat­
egory of age 90 or older; telephone numbers; fax numbers; email addresses; social securi­
ty numbers; medical record numbers; health plan beneficiary numbers; account numbers; 
certificate/license numbers; vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate 
numbers; device identifiers and serial numbers; web universal resource locators (URLs); 
Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers; biometric identifiers, including finger and voice 
prints; full face photographic images and any comparable images; and any other unique 
identifying number, characteristic, or code.110
In theory, removal of these 18 elements makes it impossible to connect medical records 
with patients’ names. However, experts have determined that even with redaction of 
these identifiers, there is a small chance (perhaps 0.01–0.25%), that skilled attackers 
could re-identify records. They could do so by matching de-identified data to publicly 
available information, such as voter registration records or news stories about individuals 
with illnesses or injuries.111
In some cases, data analysts may need some of the listed data elements to conduct their 
analysis. Obtaining consent from thousands or even millions of patients in a database may 
be prohibitively costly and burdensome. Consequently, the HIPAA Privacy Rule creates a 
further exemption for three purposes: research, public health, and healthcare operations. 
It allows covered entities to disclose “limited datasets” for these three uses without pa­
tient consent if data recipients sign data use agreements containing specified restrictions 
and privacy protections. Limited datasets remove most of the 18 listed elements, but they 
retain dates and geographic locales, though not patients’ exact addresses.112 As valuable 
as these details are for analysts, they may also make it considerably easier for attackers 
to re-identify records. By some estimates, the risk of re-identification of limited datasets 
may be as high as 10–60% depending on what other data are publicly available.113
4.2 Anonymous Data and Pseudonymized Data Under the GDPR
The difference between personal data, anonymous data, and pseudonymized data is im­
portant. Personal data and pseudonymized data fall under the scope of the GDPR, and all 
its rules must be respected. Anonymous data are outside the GDPR’s scope.
Anonymous data are data for which it is not reasonably possible to make a link with the 
data subject. It is always a perilous task to decide whether data are anonymous or not in 
the healthcare sector and especially in the field of scientific research.
Pseudonymized data are data that can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject 
without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is 
kept separately and is subject to technical and organizational measures to ensure that the 
personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person (cf. Article 
4 (5) of the GDPR).
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Pseudonymization is a useful form of data processing that can help the data controller 
meet data security requirements and comply with privacy by design and privacy by de­
fault requirements (e.g., the data minimization principle).
5 Mechanisms for Enforcement of Medical In­
formation Confidentiality, Remedies for Privacy 
Breaches, and Enforcement of Privacy Rights
5.1 American Law
5.1.1 The HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules
The most extensive American privacy regulations, the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, 
do not offer aggrieved individuals a private cause of action. Thus, individuals whose data 
were disclosed to unauthorized parties cannot sue wrongdoers for damages under federal 
law. Instead, enforcement is left up to the DHHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR) and state 
attorneys general offices.114
On its website, OCR indicates that between April 2003 and August 2019 it received more 
than 216,000 HIPAA complaints, and it initiated 979 compliance reviews on its own.115 Of 
these, OCR investigated and resolved approximately 27,225 cases, offering technical as­
sistance and requiring privacy practice changes or other corrective action. In addition, 
OCR reached settlements or imposed civil money penalties in 65 cases, recovering 
$102,681,582. In the vast majority of cases, OCR found no HIPAA violation.
HIPAA authorizes the government to punish violators with harsh fines and 
imprisonment.116 However, robust enforcement depends on adequate staffing. In an era 
in which many are hostile to “big government,” the federal workforce and its resources 
will likely shrink rather than grow. In the absence of a threat of private litigation, the HI­
PAA regulations’ efficacy could be compromised. Some covered entities may calculate 
that privacy violations are unlikely to be detected and severely punished and thus may be 
more lax about data security and disclosure than full compliance would require.
5.1.2 State Law
Unlike HIPAA, state common law enables patients to sue healthcare providers for privacy 
breaches. One tort theory is breach of confidentiality. The elements of this cause of action 
are (1) the existence of a doctor–patient relationship and (2) a physician’s or medical 
entity’s disclosure to a third party of confidential information that was gained through 
this relationship.117 For example, in the case of Alberts v. Devine, the court asserted: “We 
hold today that a duty of confidentiality arises from the physician–patient relationship and 
that a violation of that duty, resulting in damages, gives rise to an action sounding in tort 
against the physician.”118 Courts have found that the right of confidentiality is rooted in a 
variety of sources, including privilege statutes protecting physician–patient communica­
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tions, licensing statutes prohibiting the disclosure of patient information without autho­
rization, and medical ethics principles articulated in the Hippocratic Oath.119
A second tort theory that is available to plaintiffs in limited circumstances is invasion of 
privacy. Under the common law, the right to privacy can be invaded by “unreasonable 
publicity given to the other’s private life.”120 The tort of invasion of privacy consists of 
four elements: (a) public disclosure (b) of a private fact (c) that would be objectionable 
and offensive to a reasonable person and (d) that is not of legitimate public concern.121
Courts have also granted relief to those harmed by unauthorized data releases under a 
number of other theories. These include breach of trust, breach of implied contract, 
defamation, and negligence.122 Some state laws provide statutory causes of action as 
well.123
5.1.3 EU Law
To ensure data protection effectiveness, EU law requires Member States to have specific 
data protection authorities, as well as to provide for specific mechanisms and remedies.
5.1.3.1 Supervisory Authorities
At the level of the Member States, each Member State must provide for one or more inde­
pendent public authorities to be responsible for monitoring the application of the GDPR 
in order to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons in relation to 
processing and to facilitate the free flow of personal data within the EU.124 Each supervi­
sory authority must act with complete independence in performing its tasks and exercis­
ing its powers.125 The data controller, the processor, and, where applicable, their repre­
sentatives, must cooperate on request with the supervisory authority.126
At the level of the EU, the European Data Protection Board replaces the Working Party on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.127 The Board 
is composed of the head of one supervisory authority of each Member State and of the 
European Data Protection Supervisor, or their respective representatives. The Board 
must act independently when performing its tasks or exercising its powers. In the perfor­
mance of its tasks or the exercise of its powers, the Board will neither seek nor take in­
structions from anybody. The Board will draw up an annual report regarding the protec­
tion of natural persons with regard to processing in the EU and, where relevant, in third 
countries and international organizations. The European data protection supervisor will 
provide the secretariat of the Board.128
5.1.3.2 Data Subject’s Remedies
Right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority. Every data subject has the right 
to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority, in particular in the Member State of his 
or her habitual residence, place of work, or place of the alleged infringement if the data 
subject considers that the processing of personal data relating to him or her infringes the 
GDPR.129
Privacy and Integrity of Medical Information
Page 23 of 47
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 05 August 2020
Right to an effective judicial remedy against a supervisory authority. Each natural or le­
gal person shall have the right to an effective judicial remedy against a legally binding de­
cision of a supervisory authority concerning them.130 Without prejudice to any other ad­
ministrative or nonjudicial remedy, each data subject shall have the right to an effective 
judicial remedy where the supervisory authority which is competent does not handle a 
complaint or does not inform the data subject within 3 months on the progress or out­
come of the complaint.131
Right to an effective judicial remedy against a controller or processor. Each data subject 
shall have the right to an effective judicial remedy where he or she considers that his or 
her rights under the GDPR have been infringed as a result of the processing of his or her 
personal data in noncompliance with the GDPR.132
Right to compensation and liability. Any person who has suffered material or nonmaterial 
damage as a result of an infringement of the GDPR has the right to receive compensation 
from the controller or processor for the damage suffered.133 Any data controller involved 
in processing is liable for the damage caused by processing which infringes the GDPR. A 
processor is liable for the damage caused by processing only where it has not complied 
with obligations of the GDPR specifically directed to processors or where it has acted out­
side of or contrary to lawful instructions from the data controller. A data controller or 
processor is exempt from liability if it proves that it is not in any way responsible for the 
event giving rise to the damage.
Where more than one data controller or processor, or both a data controller and a proces­
sor, are involved in the same processing and where they are responsible for any damage 
caused by processing, each data controller or processor is liable for the entire damage in 
order to ensure effective compensation of the data subject.134
5.1.3.3 Administrative Obligations of Data Controllers
Notification of personal data breach to supervisory authorities and data subjects. In the 
case of a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alter­
ation, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to personal data transmitted, stored, or other­
wise processed (known as “personal data breach”135), the data controller must without 
undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of 
it,136 disclose the personal data breach to the competent supervisory authority.137 The da­
ta controller is exempted from this duty when the personal data breach is unlikely to re­
sult in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. But, in any case, the data con­
troller must document any personal data breaches, including the facts relating to the per­
sonal data breach, its effects, and the remedial action taken. That documentation must 
enable the supervisory authority to verify the compliance with the obligations applicable 
to the data controller.
Similarly, the processor must notify the data controller without undue delay after becom­
ing aware of a personal data breach. It must be assumed that it is also required to docu­
ment any data breaches even if this is not expressly foreseen in the Regulation.
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Asymmetrically in relation to the obligation to notify the supervisory authority, the data 
controller must only disclose the personal data breach to the data subject if the breach is 
likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. This could be 
the case in the situation in which a hacker publishes online data from a hospital and these 
data contain information about the health condition of patients. The communication must 
be done without undue delay. The communication to the data subject must describe in 
clear and plain language the nature of the personal data breach including, where possi­
ble, the categories and approximate number of data subjects concerned and the cate­
gories and approximate number of personal data records concerned. It must also contain 
the name and contact details of the data protection officer or any other contact point 
where more information can be obtained, the likely consequences of the personal data 
breach, and the measures taken or proposed to be taken by the controller to address the 
personal data breach including, where appropriate, measures to mitigate its possible ad­
verse effects.
However, even in the event of a high risk to rights and freedoms, this communication is 
not always required (e.g., if the hospital has taken all the appropriate measures to miti­
gate the risks for the data subject). Furthermore, if the data controller has not already 
communicated the data breach to the data subject, the supervisory authority may, after 
examining whether this data breach is likely to result in a high risk, require the data con­
troller to communicate or decide that the controller is in one of the situations in which he 
is exempted from doing so.138
Privacy impact assessment. Prior to processing, the data controller must carry out an as­
sessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the protection of per­
sonal data139 where a type of processing, particularly when using new technologies and 
taking into account the nature, scope, context, and purposes of the processing, is likely to 
result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. The controller will 
seek the advice of the data protection officer, where designated, when carrying out a data 
protection impact assessment.140
The data controller will consult the supervisory authority prior to processing where a da­
ta protection impact assessment indicates that the processing would result in a high risk 
in the absence of measures taken by the controller to mitigate the risk.141
If the supervisory authority is of the opinion that the processing would violate the GDPR, 
especially when the data controller has insufficiently identified or mitigated the risk, the 
supervisory authority must, within period of up to 8 weeks of receipt of the request for 
consultation, provide written advice to the controller. In addition where applicable to the 
processor, the supervisory authority may use any of its investigating powers, remedial 
powers, advisory powers, or any other power conferred by its national law.142
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5.1.4 Administrative Fines and Penalties
Depending on the circumstances of each individual case, each supervisory authority may 
impose effective, proportionate, and dissuasive administrative fines143 in addition to or in 
place of corrective measures.144
Member States must lay down the rules on other penalties applicable to infringements of 
the GDPR, in particular for infringements that are not subject to administrative fines. 
They must take all measures necessary to ensure that these penalties are implemented 
(and enforced). Such penalties must be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.145
To date, we are witnessing an increase in the number of infringements of the GDPR inves­
tigated by supervisory authorities, including in the healthcare sector.
6 Anti-Discrimination Laws
Despite the law’s best efforts to protect privacy, individuals’ health information is routine­
ly seen by a multitude of entities and persons. Some parties may want to use medical da­
ta to their own advantage in ways that do not serve data subjects’ best interests. Thus, 
employers, financial institutions, marketers, and others with financial agendas might use 
medical data to make adverse decisions that deprive individuals of various opportunities 
or exploit their vulnerabilities.146 Consequently, American law includes point-of-use legis­
lation that prohibits particular parties from using medical data to discriminate against da­
ta subjects. In Europe, although EU law prohibits discrimination in some contexts (no­
tably employment) on a number of forbidden grounds, health status is not one of those 
grounds. Thus, most relevant anti-discrimination laws are at the state level, with protec­
tion at the EU level occurring through the application of more general data protection 
rules.
6.1 American Law
Most notably, the ADA establishes a far-reaching anti-discrimination mandate. The ADA 
prohibits a large variety of parties from engaging in disability-based discrimination. Title 
I of the statute applies to employers with 15 or more employees. Title II relates to public 
services, including any instrumentalities of state and local governments. Title III governs 
“public accommodations and services provided by private entities,” such as banks, insur­
ance offices, private educational institutions, sales establishments, and more.147 Thus, en­
tities that possess identifiable health information and are aware of individuals’ disabilities 
may not use the data for discriminatory purposes. For example, an employer may not re­
ject a qualified applicant just because it is aware that the applicant has a history of can­
cer, diabetes, or epilepsy.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the first federal disability discrimination law, but its 
reach is more limited than the ADA’s because it focuses on federal entities. It prohibits 
programs operated by federal agencies, programs receiving federal financial assistance, 
federal employers, and federal contractors from discriminating against individuals be­
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cause of their disabilities.148 The Rehabilitation Act coexists with the ADA, which does not 
cover the executive branch of the federal government.
GINA prohibits employers and health insurers (but not others) from discriminating based 
on genetic information.149 Recall that employers and health insurers cannot intentionally 
seek genetic data, including family health histories, about individuals.150 Moreover, if 
they happen to possess genetic data, they must not use it to make adverse decisions re­
garding data subjects.151
Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is another provision that bans disability- 
based discrimination. It covers any health program or activity that is funded and/or ad­
ministrated by the US #DHHS and any health insurance marketplace insurers.152
Also relevant is the Fair Housing Act. This law prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, 
and financing of housing based on disability and other protected categories.153
Almost all states have also adopted statutory anti-discrimination mandates that protect 
individuals with disabilities.154 Many are very similar to federal law, but some offer addi­
tional protections, such as covering employers with fewer than 15 workers.
6.2 EU Law
EU law prohibits discrimination on various protected grounds, including disability, in cer­
tain contexts, particularly employment.155 However, in general, when it comes to using 
health data to discriminate, people in Europe must look to their own country’s law for 
protection. Some national legislation bans or restricts the use of medical information un­
der certain circumstances (insurance, credit, employment, school, etc.). For instance, 
“medical condition” is a prohibited ground of discrimination under the French Labor 
Code. At the EU level, the main protection against discrimination coming from the use of 
medical data must be found in data protection rules.
First, as explained earlier, personal data must be processed lawfully and for a legitimate 
purpose. The latter means that no one may process data in order to unlawfully discrimi­
nate against data subjects. Moreover, personal data must be adequate, relevant, and lim­
ited to what is necessary in relation to the legitimate purposes for which they are 
processed (this refers to the principle of data minimization). And personal data must be 
protected against unauthorized or unlawful processing. The data controller is responsible 
for compliance with these obligations, which should, at least in principle, prevent discrim­
ination against data subjects.
It must be reiterated that the assessment of the legitimacy of data processing is sensitive 
to other aspects of the implementation of data protection, such as the level of confiden­
tiality and security of the data processing, the level of control exercised by the national 
supervisory authority, the degree of necessity of the purpose pursued, and so on.
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It is also important to remember that Member States may maintain or introduce further 
conditions, including limitations, with regard to the processing of genetic data, biometric 
data, or data concerning health. Therefore, medical information privacy and confidentiali­
ty is subject to national substantive rules, which differ across European states.
7 Contemporary Legal Challenges
7.1 Data Security
As hackers and other cybercriminals become increasingly sophisticated, new data securi­
ty threats arise with dizzying speed. For example, healthcare providers must now worry 
about “ransomware attacks” by which hackers encrypt data and demand ransom in ex­
change for decryption keys, thereby denying users access to their own data until they 
comply with payment demands. The scope of this threat became clear in the wake of the 
May 2017 “WannaCry” ransomware attack that crippled the British National Health Ser­
vice and many other providers around the globe.156
The HIPAA Security Rule details many administrative, physical, and technical safeguards. 
But its recommendations are not exhaustive because its authors could not possibly antici­
pate every risk that would arise in the future. Moreover, the Security Rule deliberately 
leaves implementation mechanisms to the discretion of covered entities.157 In fact, a pro­
vision entitled “Flexibility of Approach” states: “Covered entities may use any security 
measures that allow the covered entity to reasonably and appropriately implement the 
standards and implementation specifications.”158
A flexible approach reduces covered entities’ compliance burdens. Moreover, the ap­
proach recognizes the ever-changing nature of technology and its need to continuously 
evolve to respond to new forms of cybersecurity threats.
Yet, alongside its benefits, flexibility can raise significant risks in the regulatory context. 
It can leave covered entities with anemic and inadequate guidance on how to comply with 
legal requirements. Resource-poor healthcare providers who do not have sophisticated in­
formation technology departments might be at a particular disadvantage. They would be 
well-advised to consult security experts and adopt best industry practices, but some may 
have other priorities in light of tight budgets.159
Because attackers are quick to exploit newly discovered vulnerabilities in software sys­
tems, it is critical that covered entities diligently assess and respond to these risks. It is 
also essential that regulators tirelessly follow cybersecurity threats and periodically 
reevaluate the HIPAA Security rule to determine whether and how regulations should be 
revised.
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7.2 Data Subjects’ Rights to Their Medical Information
Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, patients have a right to inspect and obtain copies of their 
medical records other than psychotherapy notes. Access requests can be denied under 
particular circumstances, such as the existence of a reasonable likelihood that seeing the 
data will result in harm to the patient or another party.160 In addition, patients may ask 
that their health records be amended or used restrictively, though covered entities may 
deny the requests for legitimate reasons specified in the regulations (e.g., the records are 
accurate and should not be changed).161
The question of the patient’s access to medical information in Europe finds a first answer 
in patient’s rights legislation but also under data protection law. And where the old Data 
Protection Directive formally recognized three rights (right of access, right to object to 
data processing, and right not to be subject to individual automated decisions), the GDPR 
grants data subjects eight rights (right to information, right of access, right to rectifica­
tion, right to erase, right to limit treatment, right to data portability, right to object to da­
ta processing, and right not to be subject to automated individual decisions).162
In particular, the right to data portability163 means that, where the data are processed on 
the basis of the data subject’s consent or a contract and by automated means, the data 
subject has the right to request and receive in a structured, commonly used, and ma­
chine-readable format the data he or she has provided to the data controller. The data 
subject is then entitled to forward these data to another data controller. The data subject 
may also ask the first controller to send them directly to another data controller if techni­
cally feasible.164 This right inevitably brings to mind the situation in which the patient’s 
medical record is shared between healthcare professionals to ensure the continuity of 
care. The implementation of this newly formalized right may therefore not be a problem 
in the health sector as long as it is extended to data not provided by the patient.165
That being said, the real challenge is to know how these rights will really and effectively 
prosper in light of the debates around cloud computing services, big data, and mobile ap­
plications and whether this formal increase in the number of rights will improve data pro­
tection and benefits for data subjects. Doubt is permitted. There should be more informa­
tion for the public on the way mobile applications work and more transparency about al­
gorithmic governance in healthcare contexts. For example, public authorities and bodies 
should disseminate more information about the numerous actors and data flows occur­
ring behind the screens of smartphones that gather health (and other) data.166
7.3 The Proliferation of Health-Related Data
It is a mistake to think that personal health information is restricted to patients’ electron­
ic health records. A large number of private and public sector entities are creating data 
resources for “secondary use” (i.e., use for non-treatment purposes). Such purposes in­
clude research, public health initiatives, healthcare institutions’ quality assessment and 
improvement efforts, and more. Health information resources are often termed “big da­
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ta,” which means large collections of data characterized by their high volume, variety, 
and velocity (the speed with which they are produced and grow).167
National, regional, and local government agencies, as well as private enterprises, have 
launched big data initiatives. The National Institutes of Health describe their All of Us 
program as follows: “The All of Us Research Program is a historic effort to gather data 
from one million or more people living in the United States to accelerate research and im­
prove health. By taking into account individual differences in lifestyle, environment, and 
biology, researchers will uncover paths toward delivering precision medicine.”168
A federal-state-industry partnership sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality has developed the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project, which created the 
State Inpatient Databases (SID). The SID contain hospital discharge records that are 
available for purchase in some states.169
Another example, this from the private sector, is IBM Watson Health. This project “brings 
together individual clinical research and social data from a diverse range of health 
sources creating a secure cloud-based data sharing hub.”170
Big data collections often consist of de-identified EHRs. Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 
covered entities can disclose fully de-identified information without patient consent, and 
information distributed by noncovered entities is not subject to any disclosure con­
straints. Thus, many patients will never discover that their records have been incorporat­
ed into a database and are being used by third parties. As noted earlier, the risk of re- 
identification can never be completely eliminated no matter how thoroughly identifiers 
are expunged.
More startlingly, when some identifiers are retained (e.g., by entities not covered by HI­
PAA), the risk of re-identification increases dramatically. In fact, it is estimated that up to 
87% of the US population could be uniquely identified based on three items alone: gen­
der, zip code, and date of birth.171 In the pre-HIPAA era, Latanya Sweeney, now a Harvard 
professor, became famous for having identified Massachusetts Governor William Weld’s 
records based on “anonymized” hospital discharge data that she matched to voter regis­
tration information when she was a graduate student in 1996.172
Health information databases are not the only source of data that could be available to 
others without patients’ knowledge. There is an abundance of what one scholar calls 
“medically inflected data.”173 Data miners seeking individuals’ health data have no short­
age of sources available to them. Supermarket loyalty cards, credit card transactions, 
web browsing histories, social media interactions, phone call records, and other data fall 
outside the jurisdiction of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, but they can reveal a great deal about 
individuals’ health. For example, experts analyzed the Facebook “likes” of approximately 
60,000 volunteers and were able to discern “sexual orientation, ethnicity, religious and 
political views, personality traits, intelligence, happiness, use of addictive substances, 
parental separation, age, and gender.”174 The risk to privacy is also demonstrated by a 
2012 Forbes magazine article entitled “How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant 
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Before Her Father Did.”175 Target was able to determine that the teenager was pregnant 
based on her purchases and began sending her coupons for baby goods.
Who might be interested in information related to individuals’ health? The list includes 
employers, lenders, marketers, advertisers, and anyone else with a stake in a person’s 
economic future. To illustrate, employers seek workers who will be healthy, productive, 
and not generate high health insurance costs. Lenders want borrowers who are healthy 
enough to work and pay back their loans. Marketers wish to tailor their advertising to fit 
customers’ needs and desires. Consequently, a growing industry of data miners and data 
brokers offers a wealth of personal information for sale.176
In the contemporary world virtually no one can escape the disclosure of personal details. 
Health data are no exception. Legislators must ensure that HIPAA and other privacy laws 
do not ignore emerging data trends and are updated to provide appropriate privacy pro­
tections.177
7.4 Predictive Health Information
Thus far, the chapter has largely addressed data that reveal something about individuals’ 
current health status. However, certain types of data may be indicators of future illness­
es, even for people who appear to be perfectly healthy at the present time.
Researchers are aggressively searching for predictive health information. For example, a 
study published in 2014 suggested that physicians could use blood tests to predict immi­
nent dementia.178 Investigators found that people who suffered from cognitive impair­
ment when their blood was drawn or within a few years of the test had lower levels of 10 
phospholipids. Data algorithms can also forecast certain diseases before their symptoms 
are apparent. Researchers have used algorithms to analyze EHR and insurance claims da­
ta to predict clinical depression, diabetes, and heart failure.179
Data that are not explicitly medical in nature can be illuminating as well. Smoking and 
childlessness are known to generate health risks.180 Researchers have found that people 
who shop in bicycle stores are generally in good health, and those who vote in midterm 
elections are healthier than those who do not.181 By contrast, individuals with low credit 
scores may not have the financial means to fill prescriptions and obtain good medical 
care and thus are vulnerable to poor health.
One can learn a great deal about people’s health from their smoking status, parental sta­
tus, purchases, voting patterns, and credit scores. Yet such information remains outside 
the scope of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules if it is not contained in a medical 
record.
Moreover, Americans are not protected against discrimination based on predictions of ill­
ness in later years. The ADA covers only individuals who (1) have a physical or mental im­
pairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, (2) have a record of 
such an impairment, or (3) are regarded as currently having such an impairment.182 It 
Privacy and Integrity of Medical Information
Page 31 of 47
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 05 August 2020
therefore does not reach healthy individuals who are subject to discrimination because 
they are suspected of being at risk of future health problems. Consequently, under the 
ADA, nothing would stop employers, lenders, educational institutions, or others from re­
jecting applicants because of anticipated medical conditions. Almost no other anti-dis­
crimination law (with the exception of GINA, which governs only genetic information) is 
broad enough to prohibit discrimination based solely on predictive data.
As prognostic abilities improve, third parties may increasingly seek predictive data from 
data brokers. They will be valuable for anyone who has a stake in others’ health as an em­
ployer, lender, advertiser, etc. Once the information is in such parties’ possession, they 
are free to use it as they see fit. This includes making adverse decisions about individuals 
in order to avoid business risks and save costs.
Consequently, the privacy laws are not the only legislation that may need to be amended 
in order to be aligned with current technological and medical capabilities. The ADA and 
other anti-discrimination laws, which focus only on current disabilities, also require revi­
sion. It is inevitable that some personal health-related information will fall into the hands 
of others without patient consent. Patients would be well-served by protections that limit 
the uses to which such information can be put. American law should uniformly prohibit 
discrimination based on predictive health information.
By contrast, with sectoral or point-of-use legislation, the GDPR provides a comprehensive 
framework regulating the processing of all personal data. However, there is room for 
some national legislation in addition to the GDPR rules, even if the limits of Member 
States freedom are not always straightforward in the matter of data protection. It is also 
important to recall that the GDPR rules must be analyzed, implemented, and interpreted 
in light of Convention no. 108+ and all the sectorial recommendations adopted by the 
Council of Europe in the matter of data protection.
8 Conclusion
With the enactment of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rule early in the 21st century, 
American law took a leap forward in the area of medical privacy. However, contemporary 
privacy and anti-discrimination laws still contain significant gaps and limitations. Much 
regulatory work remains to be done to ensure that Americans enjoy comprehensive legal 
protections.
In Europe, the GDPR has consolidated the previous applicable rules from Directive 95/46/ 
EC. Furthermore, it has expanded and developed certain requirements, and it has also 
created some new obligations for data controllers and data processors. But the GDPR 
does not provide a specific set of rules for the processing of personal data concerning 
health, except the rules for lifting the ban on their processing (Article 9 of the GDPR). 
The consequence is that processing of health data is mainly subject to the general regime 
put into place by the GDPR, with some special rules about when it is lawful to process 
health data. In fact, the real challenge lies more in making the GDPR an effective tool for 
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protection of citizens’ rights when it comes to the processing of personal data related to 
them. Today, this challenge should focus on how to inform data subjects about their rights 
and on the way new information and communication technologies work, including new ac­
tors in data flows in eHealth and mHealth. This is all the more true when considering mo­
bile health applications and big data in the context of scientific and medical research. As 
in the United States, there is more regulatory work to be done.
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and 58 of the Regulation.
See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Guidelines for identifying a controller or 
processor’s lead supervisory authority WP 244 rev.01 5 April 2017.
(125.) See Article 52 of the Regulation.
(126.) Article 31 of the Regulation. The application of an approved Code of Conduct or an 
approved certification mechanism may serve as an element to demonstrate compliance 
with date processing security requirements.
(127.) See Article 68 of the Regulation. Article 70 lists its missions.
(128.) The European Data Protection Supervisor is also the supervisory authority for EU­
ROPOL.
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(129.) It is not easy to argue that this right exists in the case of a breach of a rule which 
would be imposed by a Member State within the scope of the discretion which would be 
accorded to the state for the implementation of a particular provision of the Regulation. 
See Article 80 on the question of the representation of data subjects.
(130.) Directive 95/46/EC already provided that Decisions by the supervisory authority 
which give rise to complaints may be appealed against through the courts (Article 28.3, in 
fine). See Article 78.1 of the Regulation. Proceedings against a supervisory authority 
must be brought before the courts of the Member State where the supervisory authority 
is established. Where proceedings are brought against a decision of a supervisory author­
ity which was preceded by an opinion or a decision of the Board in the consistency mech­
anism, the supervisory authority shall forward that opinion or decision to the court (Arti­
cle 78.4 of the Regulation).
(131.) See Article 78.2 of the Regulation. Proceedings against a supervisory authority 
must be brought before the courts of the Member State where the supervisory authority 
is established. Where proceedings are brought against a decision of a supervisory author­
ity which was preceded by an opinion or a decision of the Board in the consistency mech­
anism, the supervisory authority shall forward that opinion or decision to the court (Arti­
cle 78.4 of the Regulation).
(132.) See Article 79.1 of the Regulation. Proceedings against a controller or a processor 
must be brought before the courts of the Member State where the controller or processor 
has an establishment. Alternatively, such proceedings may be brought before the courts 
of the Member State where the data subject has his or her habitual residence, unless the 
controller or processor is a public authority of a Member State acting in the exercise of 
its public powers.
(133.) Court proceedings for exercising the right to receive compensation must be 
brought before the courts competent under the law of the Member State where the data 
controller or processor has an establishment. Alternatively, such proceedings may be 
brought before the courts of the Member State where the data subject has his or her ha­
bitual residence, unless the controller or processor is a public authority of a Member 
State acting in the exercise of its public powers.
(134.) See Article 82 of the Regulation. Where a controller or processor has, in accor­
dance with paragraph 4, paid full compensation for the damage suffered, that controller 
or processor shall be entitled to claim back from the other controllers or processors in­
volved in the same processing that part of the compensation corresponding to their part 
of responsibility for the damage.
(135.) Article 4.12 of the Regulation. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Work­
ing Document 01/2011 on the current EU personal data breach framework and recom­
mendations for future policy developments WP 184 5 April 2011, Opinion 03/2014 on Per­
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sonal Data Breach Notification WP 213 25 March 2014, and Guidelines on Personal data 
breach notification under Regulation 2016/679 WP 250 rev.01 6 February 2018.
(136.) See Article 33 of the Regulation. Where the notification to the supervisory authori­
ty is not made within 72 hours, it has to be accompanied by reasons for the delay. Where, 
and in so far as it is not possible to provide the information at the same time, the informa­
tion may be provided in phases without undue further delay.
(137.) The notification must at least describe the nature of the personal data breach in­
cluding where possible, the categories and approximate number of data subjects con­
cerned, and the categories and approximate number of personal data records concerned; 
communicate the name and contact details of the data protection officer or other contact 
point where more information can be obtained; describe the likely consequences of the 
personal data breach; and describe the measures taken or proposed to be taken by the 
controller to address the personal data breach, including, where appropriate, measures 
to mitigate its possible adverse effects.
(138.) Article 34 of the Regulation.
(139.) See: D. WRIGHT & P. DE HET (ed.), PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, Law, Gover­
nance and Technology Series, volume 6 (Springer, 2012); and Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining 
whether processing is “likely to result in a high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 
2016/679 WP 248 4 April 2017.
(140.) See Article 35 of the Regulation. A single assessment may address a set of similar 
processing operations that present similar high risks. The controller shall seek the advice 
of the data protection officer, where designated, when carrying out a data protection im­
pact assessment (leaving open the question of the obligation to do so when the controller 
had no obligation [formally or in the framework of technical and organizational measures] 
to designate one but still did it).
The supervisory authority must establish and make public a list of the kind of processing 
operations which are subject to the requirement for a data protection impact assessment. 
The supervisory authority must communicate those lists to the European Data Protection 
Board. The supervisory authority may also establish and make public a list of the kind of 
processing operations for which no data protection impact assessment is required. The 
supervisory authority shall communicate those lists to the European Data Protection 
Board. Prior to the adoption of the lists, the competent supervisory authority will apply 
the consistency mechanism where such lists involve processing activities which are relat­
ed to the offering of goods or services to data subjects or to the monitoring of their be­
havior in several Member States or may substantially affect the free movement of person­
al data within the Union.
Compliance with approved codes of conduct by the relevant controllers or processors 
must be taken into due account in assessing the impact of the processing operations per­
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formed by such controllers or processors, in particular for the purposes of a data protec­
tion impact assessment.
Where appropriate, the data controller must seek the views of data subjects or their rep­
resentatives on the intended processing, without prejudice to the protection of commer­
cial or public interests or the security of processing operations.
(141.) When consulting the supervisory authority pursuant to paragraph 1, the controller 
shall provide the supervisory authority with (Article 36.3 of the Regulation):
(1.) where applicable, the respective responsibilities of the controller, joint con­
trollers, and processors involved in the processing, in particular for processing with­
in a group of undertakings;
(2.) the purposes and means of the intended processing;
(3.) the measures and safeguards provided to protect the rights and freedoms of data 
subjects pursuant to this Regulation;
(4.) where applicable, the contact details of the data protection officer;
(5.) the data protection impact assessment;
(6.) and any other information requested by the supervisory authority.
(142.) See Article 58 of the Regulation.
(143.) On all of this and in particular the factors to be taken into account in each individ­
ual case, see Article 83 of the Regulation.
(144.) See the list of corrective measures in Article 58.2, a) to h), and j) of the Regulation. 
See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Guidelines on the application and set­
ting of administrative fines for the purposes of the Regulation 2016/679 WP 253 3 Octo­
ber 2017. Public bodies enjoy a special regime.
(145.) See Article 84 of the Regulation.
(146.) Sharona Hoffman, Big Data and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 HASTINGS 
L. J. 777, 778 (2017).
(147.) 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12189 (2010).
(148.) 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794(a) (2010).
(149.) Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 110–233, 122 Stat. 881 §§ 
201(4) & 202(a) (2008); 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2010); 42 U.S.C. §2000ff-1(a) (2010). Genetic 
information is defined as including (i) an individual’s genetic tests, (ii) the genetic tests of 
an individual’s family members, and (iii) the manifestation of a disease or disorder in an 
individual’s family members. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff (4)(A) (2010).
(150.) 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (c) & (d) (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b) (2010).
(151.) 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) & (b) (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (2010).
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(152.) 42 U.S.C. §18116 (2010).
(153.) 42 U.S.C. 3604 (2010).
(154.) National Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws on Employment-Related Dis­
crimination, July 2015, http://www.ncsl.org/documents/employ/Discrimination- 
Chart-2015.pdf; Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Disability Rights and Public Accommodations: 
State-by-State (2011), http://adasoutheast.org/publications/ada/ 
public_accommodations_disability_rights_state-by-state_Final.pdf.
(155.) Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000, establishing a general frame­
work for equal treatment in employment and occupation. Official Journal (EC) L 303/16 of 
2 Dec. 2000.
(156.) I. Glenn Cohen et al., Your Money or Your Patient’s Life? Ransomware and Elec­
tronic Health Records, 167 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 587 (2017).
(157.) 45 C.F.R. § 164.306 (b) (2018).
(158.) 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(1) (2018).
(159.) SHARONA HOFFMAN, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS AND MEDICAL BIG DA­
TA: LAW AND POLICY 69–70 (Cambridge University Press 2016); Hoffman & Podgurski, 
supra note 21, at 350–354.
(160.) 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2018)
(161.) 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.524 and 164.526 (2018).
(162.) See the limits which may be imposed on these rights by Union law or by the law of 
the Member State to which the controller or processor is subject, by means of legislative 
measures, in accordance with Article 23 of the Regulation. These limits are permissible 
only if they respect the essence of fundamental rights and freedoms and are necessary 
and proportionate measures in a democratic society to guarantee one of the objectives 
listed in this provision. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Guidelines on Trans­
parency under Regulation 2016/679 WP 260 rev.01 11 April 2018 and Guidelines on Auto­
mated individual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679 
WP 251 rev.01 6 February 2018.
(163.) Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Guidelines on the right to data portability 
WP 242 rev.01 5 April 2017.
(164.) See Article 20 of the Regulation. This right is without prejudice to the right to era­
sure or to be forgotten. That right does not apply to processing necessary for the perfor­
mance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority 
vested in the controller. In addition, it cannot adversely affect the rights and freedoms of 
others.
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(165.) See, e.g., Article 4.2 (f) of Directive 2011/24/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border health­
care (see the consolidated text), which provides that in order to ensure continuity of care, 
patients who have received treatment are entitled to a written or electronic medical 
record of such treatment and access to at least a copy of this record in conformity with 
and subject to national measures implementing Union provisions on the protection of per­
sonal data, in particular Directives 95/46/EC and 2002/58/EC.
(166.) Recently, the British Medical Journal has published a very interesting study on the 
data flows behind mobile health applications (Q. Grundy, K. Chiu, F. Held, A. Continella, L. 
Bero, & R. Holz. Data sharing practices of medicines related apps and the mobile ecosys­
tem: traffic, content, and network analysis, 364 BMJ 1920 (2019). These kind of studies 
should be more encouraged, and they should receive more coverage from the news me­
dia.
(167.) Gil Press, 12 Big Data Definitions: What’s Yours?, FORBES, Sept. 3, 2014, https:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2014/09/03/12-big-data-definitions-whats-yours/ 
#6301d92913ae.
(168.) National Institutes of Health, All of Us Research Program (last visited Dec. 21, 
2017), https://allofus.nih.gov/.
(169.) Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project, Overview of the State Inpatient Databases 
(SID) (last modified Apr. 18, 2017), http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/sidoverview.jsp.
(170.) Margaret Bays, IBM Watson Health: How Does it Work? IBM DEVELOPER WORKS 
(June 15, 2017), https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/community/blogs/ 
e3ec7365-1b09-44f2-906f-19826275860f/entry/IBM_Watson_Health_How_Does_it_work? 
lang=en.
(171.) Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 112, at 105; Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demo­
graphics Often Identify People Uniquely, Carnegie Mellon University, Data Privacy Work­
ing Paper 3. Pittsburgh (2000), https://dataprivacylab.org/projects/identifiability/ 
paper1.pdf.
(172.) Kathleen Benitez & Bradley Malin, Evaluating Re-identification Risks with Respect 
to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 17 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 169, 169 (2010).
(173.) Nicolas P. Terry, Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism, 24 HEALTH 
MATRIX 65, 77 (2014).
(174.) Michal Kosinskia,1, David Stillwella, & Thore Graepel, Private Traits and Attributes 
Are Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PNAS 5733, 5733 (2013), 
http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~knutson/bad/kosinski13.pdf.
(175.) . Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Fa­
ther Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/ 
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how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/#7c4f90266668 
(discussing Target’s practice of data-mining its customers’ purchasing records in order 
“to figure out what you like, what you need, and which coupons are most likely to make 
you happy”).
(176.) Sharona Hoffman, Citizen Science: The Law and Ethics of Public Access to Medical 
Big Data, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1741, 1773–1780 (2016).
(177.) For recommendations see HOFFMAN, supra note 4, at 73-79 and 148-51.
(178.) Alison Abbott, Biomarkers Could Predict Alzheimer’s before It Starts, NATURE, 
March 9, 2014, http://www.nature.com/news/biomarkers-could-predict-alzheimer-s-be­
fore-it-starts-1.14834.
(179.) Mohana Ravindranath, IBM Used Predictive Analytics to Find Patients at Risk of 
Heart Failure, WASH. POST, February 20, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/busi­
ness/on-it/ibm-used-predictive-analytics-to-find-patients-at-risk-of-heart-failure/ 
2014/02/20/9b0ddb3c-9a47-11e3-b88d-f36c07223d88_story.html; Arthur Allen, Big Broth­
er Is Watching Your Waist, POLITICO, July 21, 2014, http://www.politico.com/story/ 
2014/07/data-mining-health-care-109153; Susan H. Babey et al., Prediabetes in Califor­
nia: Nearly Half of California Adults on Path to Diabetes, UCLA Center for Health Policy 
Research Health Policy Brief (March 2016), http://healthpolicy.ucla.edu/publications/Doc­
uments/PDF/2016/prediabetes-brief-mar2016.pdf.
(180.) Sharona Hoffman, Big Data and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 HASTINGS 
L. J. 777, 784–785 (2017).
(181.) Rachel Emma Silverman, Bosses Tap Outside Firms to Predict Which Workers 
Might Get Sick, WALL ST. J., February 17, 2016, https://thebenefitblog.com/2016/02/19/ 
bosses-tap-outside-firms-to-predict-which-workers-might-get-sick/.
(182.) 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2010).
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